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PREGNANCY BENEFITS, BENIGN 
SEX DISCRIMINATION, AND 
JUSTICE: WHY DOES IT 
MATTER HOW WE ASK 
THE QUESTIONS? 
by Patricia Ann Boling* 
"He who calls the game, names the winner." The old ex-
pression is perhaps even truer in courts of law than in poker: 
Surely we need to acknowledge and consider the power involved 
in framing issues for judicial resolution. The way in which a 
problem is formulated will influence the approach, relevant data, 
and appropriate remedy applied to the issues in question. No-
where is this more evident than in the controversy over the use 
of pregnancy classifications in cases involving disability and 
sickness benefits and seniority determinations. 
The Supreme Court held in divided decisions, Geduldig v. 
Aiello1 and General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,2 that denial of disa-
bility benefits for normal pregnancies does not discriminate on 
the basis of sex, either under an equal protection analysis 
(Geduldig) or under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 
(Gilbert). Nevertheless, in a later decision, Nashville Gas Co. v. 
Batty;' the entire Court decided that workers cannot be de-
prived of accumulated seniority simply because they have taken 
leaves of absence for normal childbirths. 
In some regards, the question of resolving the tension be-
tween Batty and the pregnancy benefit cases has been rendered . 
moot by the 1978 amendment to the Civil Rights Act,15 which 
* Attended Hastings College of the Law; candidate for Ph.D. in political science, 
University of California, Berkeley. 
1. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
2. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 92-251, § 
2(a)(~1), 92 Stat. 183 (1978). 
4. 434 U.S. 136 (1977). 
5. Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (amending 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e (1976». 
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explicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 
Nevertheless, the debate about whether denying women workers 
disability benefits for pregnancies constitutes sex discrimination 
remains a lively one. A recent article in the Texas Law Review6 
attempted to explain why it was plausible that pregnancy disa-
bility benefits were treated differently than seniority. The au-
thors, Kirp and Robyn, argue that seniority is more closely con-
nected to the personal dignity of the individual worker than 
payments for temporary disabilities such as pregnancy,? which 
can be anticipated (unlike most illnesses),8 funded by the family 
unit,9 and which are often excluded from disability and health 
insurance programs as part of a mutual agreement negotiated 
between unions and employers.1o Kirp and Robyn consider the 
Court's decisions in Geduldig, Gilbert, and Batty, as well as the 
1978 legislative action which overruled Gilbert, sensible in light 
of their primary policy criterion, distributive justice.l1 But what 
is disturbing about their public policy approach to the preg-
nancy benefits issue is that, despite the attention to the equities 
of paying for pregnancies as opposed to other disabilities, and of 
shifting the cost from childbearing families to worker-employer-
consumer funded insurance programs, Kirp and Robyn overlook 
the impact a refusal to fund pregnancy leaves on the family and 
career possibilities and personal dignity of women workers. 
One purpose of this essay will be to respond to this argu-
ment by showing what sorts of considerations are pertinent and 
what conclusions are warranted if one considers the underlying 
issue in pregnancy benefits cases to be distributive justice, and 
then contrasting this with the considerations and judgments in-
dicated by a more comprehensive view of sex discrimination. 
There are other reasons as well for maintaining the -debate 
about the proper perspective on pregnancy disability issues. The 
Court's difficulties in convincingly justifying the refusal to 
equate pregnancy with sex-based discrimination in Geduldig 
and Gilbert, and in distinguishing the seniority and pregnancy 
6. Kirp & Robyn, Pregnancy, Justice, and the Justices, 57 TEx. L. REv. 947 (1979). 
7. Id. at 957-58. 
8. Id. at 956. 
9. Id. at 955. 
10. Id. at 954-55. 
11. Id. at 948, 954, 960. 
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benefit situations, have been paralleled by untenable distinc-
tions and unconvincing justifications in more recent cases in-
volving "benign" sex discrimination.12 Perhaps a clearly articu-
lated debate about how to frame the pregnancy benefit issue can 
help resolve the analytical confusion apparent in these later 
cases. 
Finally, the debate about issue-framing in the context of 
pregnancy disability and benign discrimination cases will be 
used to illustrate some more general problems which arise when 
one is forced to choose between competing conceptualizations of 
a problem. This is, of course, the task in which judges are con-
stantly engaged. Why is it that the choice seems so wrong at 
times? Why do courts seem to be so partial in their views, to 
have overlooked so much of what seems to be relevant to a given 
problem? Are there areas of law, like sex discrimination, where 
the issues appear so indefinite and unsettled that courts have 
genuine difficulties justifying their decisions in light of the mul-
tiple arguments to which they need respond, or at least to con-
sider? This process is a function of the competing formulations 
of an issue, none of which seem to be clearly accurate, correct, or 
comprehensive, and each with uncertain criteria or guides for 
choosing among them. Is it necessary to make such choices, or 
can we blend different appreciations of a situation in order to 
resolve the issue with some sensitivity to the concerns of each? 
I. PREGNANCY BENEFITS 
A. As A QUESTION OF DISTRmUTIVE JUSTICE 
Competing formulations of gender policy questions are in-
commensurable because they affect the factors to which one will 
be sensitive in making decisions regarding pregnancy benefits 
and benign sex discrimination. 
12. One line of benign sex discrimination cases, Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); 
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); and Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); 
upholds the use of sex-based classifications in order to remedy a long history of discrimi-
nation against women. The other line, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); and Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); strikes down 
the use of such classifcations as vestiges of "romantic paternalism" and outmoded, 
demeaning ways of thinking about women as the "weaker sex." For a discussion of the 
inconsistency between these two lines of cases, see notes 40-60 infra and accompanying 
text. 
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Kirp and Robyn argue that the differing results reached in 
Geduldig and Gilbert, in which the Court upheld programs de-
nying disability benefits for pregnancy, and Satty, in which the 
Court reversed a denial of seniority for taking a pregnancy leave, 
are best understood when disability payments are viewed as 
"transfer payments to childbearing families, and not as another 
skirmish in the war between the sexes. "18 They claim to offer a 
better rationale for the seemingly inconsistent results reached by 
the Court by framing the issue in the disability payment cases in 
terms of distributive justice rather than sex discrimination.14 
Distributive justice offers a sound basis for denying disabil-
ity payments for pregnancy; it argues that it may be fairer for 
childbearing families to bear the cost of pregnancies than it is to 
distribute that cost to workers and consumers in the form of re-
duced benefits and increased prices. But several assumptions 
about pregnancy become relevant when one adopts this perspec-
tive. First, the authors suggest that the relevant class in analyz-
ing pregnancy is not pregnant women or women in general, but 
the childbearing family. Iii If one assumes that pregnancy is a de-
cision which will be planned for and financed by a couple, then 
it is easier to view pregnancy costs in this manner .16 After all, 
the couple will bear these costs together, basing the decision to 
have children on a calculation based on their joint earning power 
and job security. 
Secondly, viewing pregnancy benefits as primarily a distrib-
utive question rather than an issue involving sex discrimination 
invites a comparison between pregnancy and other kinds of disa-
bilities which health and disability insurance might cover. Preg-
nancy is not particularly expensive for the i~dividual family, but 
it is quite expensive in the aggregate because it is so common.1'7 
Unlike illness, Kirp and Robyn argue that pregnancy is generally 
a voluntary and joyous occurrence. IS Thus, distributive justice 
13. Kirp & Robyn, supra note 6, at 948. 
14. ld. at 964-67. 
15. ld. at 955. 
16. The 'costs of pregnancy include medical expenses and the general financial bur-
den of a child, as well as the interruption of the woman's career and the general relega-
tion of women to low-paying, low-status, interchangeable jobs. 
17. Kirp & Robyn, supra note 6, at 955. . 
18. ld. at 956. 
Women's Law Forum 
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would dictate that we balance pregnancy against other ills which 
might also be insurable, considering the relative ability of the 
childbearing family to plan and pay for pregnancies and the in-
ability of older people to avoid or afford illness. 
Kirp and Robyn offer distributive justice as an alternate an-
alytic framework to the Court's strained attempt to distinguish 
pregnancy classifications from sex discrimination, which was at 
the core of Geduldig and Gilbert.19 Note 20 of the Court's opin-
ion in Geduldig, quoted with approval in Gilbert, reads in part: 
The California insurance program does not ex-
clude anyone from benefit eligibility because of 
gender but merely removes one physical condi-
tion-pregnancy-from the list of compensable 
disabilities . . . . 
The lack of identity between the excluded 
disability and gender as such under this insurance 
program becomes clear upon the most cursory 
analysis. The program divides potential recipients 
into two groups-pregnant women and non-
pregnant persons.20 
As Kirp and Robyn note, the statement that pregnancy 
classifications do not discriminate on the basis of sex because, at 
any given moment not all women are pregnant, is analogous to 
the statement that segregated schools do not discriminate on the 
basis of race because not all blacks are in school.21 The results 
reached in Geduldig and Gilbert are more convincing when the 
issues involved are viewed as attempts to implicitly embrace dis-
tributive arguments rather than as attempts to argue that the 
exclusion of pregnancy is not a sex-based classification. Viewing 
the issue as a compromise between assuring women that they 
will not be penalized for deciding to take a leave from work to 
have children, and assuring workers that their contributions to 
insurance programs will not be exorbitant, or as a compromise 
between paying pregnancy benefits and paying for black lung, or 
kidney dialysis, or injuries suffered in auto accidents, clearly 
shapes the perspective taken on the issue of a woman's auton-
omy of choice as a worker and mother. 
19. ld. at 953-54. 
20. 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20. 
21. Kirp & Robyn, supra note 6, at 951. 
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Viewing the pregnancy benefit decisions in terms of distri-
butional issues indicates that it is permissible to compare preg-
nancy with other kinds of illness covered by health insurance, 
and to compare childbearing families with workers and consum-
ers at large. Certainly the Geduldig and Gilbert results are more 
sensible when viewed as a deliberate redistributive policy than 
they are as refutations of alleged sex discrimination. But if one 
were to reverse the question-consider seriously the claim that 
payment of unemployment benefits for pregnant workers impli-
cates the right of women workers to equal protection under the 
law, and treat the distributive arguments as a secondary issue-
one might well conclude that Geduldig and Gilbert were wrongly 
decided. Such an approach to questions of sex discrimination 
would probably lead to the conclusion that insurance programs 
should fund pregnancy leaves. Different considerations arise if 
we treat pregnancy policy primarily as a question involving sex 
discrimination. 
B. As A QUESTION OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 
If a distributive justice analysis requires consideration of 
competing demands on health insurance, the relative seriousness 
or accidental character of other kinds of illnesses, and the rela-
tive ability of the childbearing family to pay and plan for preg-
nancy, then shaping the issue in terms of sex discrimination 
reveals an entirely different set of concerns. One becomes con-
cerned with the relative position of women in the job market, 
and especially with the ramifications unpaid pregnancy leaves 
have on women's career and marriage choices.22 If assuring wo-
men choice, equality, and respect in both the workplace and the 
home is the goal of a serious perspective on sex discrimination, 
then it becomes especially important to compensate women for 
pregnancy and childbirth leaves because pregnancy is a predict-
able and recurrent event in many women's lives. Without a con-
scious effort to meet the demands of the dual roles women play 
as workers and mothers, there is little chance to change tradi-
tional patterns of dependence and differing opportunities for 
workplace respect and advancement for either sex. Professor 
22. Women are funneled into low-status, low-paying interchangeable jobs that are 
easily interrupted. This perpetuates the concept of the man's salary as the economic 
basis of a marriage, and the woman's salary as secondary and more expendable. 
Women's Law Forum 
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Tribe views the unequal treatment and status of women as the 
crux of discrimination. In a critical discussion of the Court's re-
fusal to grant pregnancy benefits, he stated: 
Both [Geduldig and Gilbert] evidence a degree of 
judicial blindness to the extreme importance for 
women of being able to combine the roles of em-
ployees and child-bearers if they choose: Women 
will not enjoy truly equal rights in the labor mar-
ket until it is recognized that their health care 
needs are indeed different from men's and that 
insurance coverage for absences incurred during 
pregnancy and childbirth may be needed if wo-
men are in fact to be placed in positions of equal 
opportunity/'S 
If one views the pregnancy benefits as fundamentally an is-
sue of sex discrimination, one questions whether it is appropri-
ate or accurate to assume that most pregnancies occur within 
the context of a childbearing family, or to assume that preg-
nancy is usually a voluntary, joyous event. The protection of 
nontraditional households becomes more important, as for ex-
ample, in single parent households, or families in which the wo-
man is the chief wage earner. These are situations in which a 
salary interruption of several months would work a real hard-
ship. One might also consider the ways in which pregnancy is 
like other illnesses as, for instance, when it is unplanned, un-
wanted, and physically and emotionally stressful. Even within 
the context of a planned pregnancy by a married couple, it may 
be important for the woman's feelings of independence and self 
worth vis-a-vis her colleagues that she receive benefits for a 
pregnancy leave. We should be careful not to stigmatize preg-
nancy as an option for a conscientious, motivated, career-
minded woman.2 ' 
C. DISTRmuTIVE JUSTICE VS. SEX DISCRIMINATION 
Having discussed the different kinds of considerations and 
conclusions to which the "redistribution" and "discrimination" 
perspectives lead in characterizing pregnancy benefits, the ques-
23. L. TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1072-73 (1978) (footnotes omitted). 
24. For an example of how women have been so stigmatized, see Justice Stevens' 
reference in his concurring opinion in Satty to the employer's "initial decision to treat 
pregnancy as an unexcused absence." 434 U.S. at 156. 
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tion arises how one chooses between these two perspectives-or 
whether the choice is even necessary. In important ways, "dis-
tributive justice" and "sex discrimination" appear to be mutu-
ally exclusive ways of framing the issue of whether women 
should receive pregnancy benefits. Posing the issue as one of 
finding the fairest way to distribute benefits among workers 
without unduly increasing the cost of health insurance premi-
ums is likely to emphasize the equities of a labor-management 
bargain which excludes pregnancy from the medical benefit 
package, or the desirability of reducing employee contributions 
to state programs. Nevertheless, treating pregnanc.y as just an-
other disability to fund or not depending on its costliness and 
avoidability, artificially preempts considerations about the sex-
specific nature of pregnancy and its impact on the lifestyle and 
careers of women workers. Assuming that pregnancy decisions 
are not solely a woman's affair, and are usually made jointly by a 
couple, again ignores the impact uncompensated leaves of ab-
sence for pregnancy can have on women's self-image as well as 
on employment possibilities. Yet, if focusing on distributional 
fairness overlooks considerations of sexual equality, a different 
focus on "gender justice" may be just as likely to eclipse critical 
questions of cost, efficiency, and relative ability to afford the 
plan for medical needs. 
Both ways of framing the issue reach relevant-and differ-
ent-aspects of public policy regarding pregnancy. One can cer-
tainly imagine weighing the value of sexual equality against the 
value of otherwise economical medical protection for workers. 
On the other hand, weighing sexual equality against fairness, 
economy, and efficiency in allocating medical benefits is like 
comparing apples and oranges; the balance is uncertain because 
the two values at stake are so different in character. This diffi-
culty of comparison suggests part of the way in which these two 
views are incommensurable. Once phrased in terms of distribu-
tive justice, the problem becomes difficult to appreciate in terms 
of the competing values of autonomy and equality for women, or 
the perpetuation of traditional sex roles and discrimination in 
the workplace. This is, however, precisely what happens when 
Kirp and Robyn translate discrimination into a distributive 
question: The discussion precludes consideration of sex 
discrimination. 
Women's Law Forum 
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How one chooses a paradigm, or analytical framework, may 
simply depend on one's notion of justice. Which is more objec-
tionable: higher insurance premiums or pervasive sex discrimi-
nation in the workplace? Perhaps we can construct a fuller an-
swer-one which explains how the persuasiveness of the 
analytical framework changes with the particular fact situation 
and substantive policy issues at stake-by studying how Satty,25 
which upheld the right to accumulated seniority throughout 
pregnancy leaves, was distinguished from Geduldig and Gilbert. 
Constructing a pattern to those decisions in which sex discrimi-
nation was the controlling form of analysis may help pinpoint 
some of the Court's implicit criteria for choosing one analysis 
over another. The pregnancy benefit cases, marked by vigorous 
dissents finding unjustifiable sex discrimination under Reed v. 
Reed26 and Frontiero v. Richardson,27 contrast well with Satty. 
In Satty, the Court held that denying an employee her accumu-
lated seniority for taking a ten-week pregnancy leave violated 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.28 Because the case 
questioned both the employer's practice of refusing sick pay to 
pregnant employees and the policy of denying seniority to wo-
men returning from pregnancy leave, Justice Rehnquist's opin-
ion for the majority shows how the Court distinguished the two 
issues. Loss of seniority was viewed as a more serious depriva-
tion than denial of sick pay for pregnancy, because "the direct 
effect of the [pregnancy benefit] exclusion is merely a loss of in-
come for the period the employee is not at work; such an exclu-
sion has no direct effect upon either employment opportunities 
or job status."29 The Court recognized, however, just how devas-
tating loss of seniority could be for an employee's opportunities 
and status within the company, as an earlier portion of the opin-
ion makes clear: 
[i]t is beyond dispute that petitioner's policy of 
depriving employees returning from pregnancy 
leave of their accumulated seniority acts both to 
deprive them 'of employment opportunities' and 
to 'adversely affect [their] status as an employee' 
25. 434 U.S. 136 (1977). 
26. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
27. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 92-251, § 
2(a)(11), 92 Stat. 183 (1978). 
29. 434 U.S. at 145. 
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. . . . Even if she [plaintiff] had ultimately been 
able to regain a permanent position with peti-
tioner, she would have felt the effects of a lower 
seniority level, with its attendant relegation to 
less desirable and lower-paying jobs, for the re-
mainder of her career with petitioner.3o 
Justice Stevens made the same point slightly differently in 
his concurrence. He argued that the difference between the disa-
bility benefit and seniority issues is like the difference between 
discriminating against a temporary physical condition, by refus-
ing to pay workers while they are absent from work for preg-
nancy, and discriminating against a formerly pregnant person 
who will be permanently disadvantaged by the loss of accumu-
lated seniority.8l Kirp and Robyn add that loss of seniority has 
especially serious consequences because the system "represents 
the way in which an employer respects an employee's service," 
and therefore, the worker's "personal status created by the re-
ward system of the institution-is very much at issue .... "82 
Loss of seniority may be an easier issue for the Court to 
deal with than denial of pregnancy benefits. The impact of the 
seniority policy is considered graver and more personalized even 
though an unpaid vacation for childbirth may have an equally 
serious impact on the employee. The critical difference between 
Batty, and Geduldig and Gilbert is that the latter two cases in-
volve competing interests regarding health insurance costs and 
inviolability of the bargaining process, whereas the former does 
not. Clearly, seniority differs from pregnancy disability pay-
ments in that seniority is simply recognition that accrues with 
employment longevity, rather than as one of many competing 
demands on the limited resources of the health insurance fund. 
Benefiting one employee by allowing her to retain accumulated 
seniority after returning from pregnancy leave does not affect 
the seniority or benefits enjoyed by others. In the context of sick 
leave or disability payments for pregnancy, however, the trade-
offs involved concerning higher costs and smaller medical cover-
age are quite apparent. 
30. [d. at 141. 
31. [d. at 156. 
32. Kirp & Robyn, supra note 6, at 957-58. 
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Justice Stewart discusses these trade-offs in Geduldig, 
which is largely a defense of state discretion in matters of fiscal 
policy. California's disability insurance program, funded by a 
contribution rate of one percent from employee wages, was at-
tacked as discriminating against women for failure to fund nor-
mal pregnancies and childbirths. The reasons adduced for main-
taining the current contribution rate, which precluded financing 
pregnancies, ranged from California's strong commitment to 
maintenance of a low contribution rate; to the fact that one per-
cent is "easily computable"; the fact that the one percent rate 
has generally met the costs of the currently covered disabili-
ties;33 and the desire to keep contributions low in order not to 
burden low income workers.34 The Court readily affirmed the 
state's actions, declaring that: 
Particularly with respect to social welfare pro-
grams, so long as the line drawn by the State is 
rationally supportable, the courts will not inter-
pose their judgment as to the appropriate stop-
ping point. 'The Equal Protection Clause does not 
require that a state must choose between attack-
ing every aspect of a problem or not attacking the 
problem at all.'35 
Contrasting the Court's deference to legislative judgment 
about distributive concerns with its willingness to protect senior-
ity rights not only reiterates the argument that the distributive 
and discrimination perspectives lead to different emphases and 
results, but also suggests that attention to discrimination is par-
ticularly likely to give way to distributive concerns when policies 
deal with state insurance or welfare programs and public fiscal 
policy. 
II. BENIGN SEX DISCRIMINATION 
Benign sex discrimination decisions reveal a similar analyti-
cal pattern. Often a determination of constitutionality depends 
on whether the statute is viewed as perpetuating traditional, 
stereotypical generalizations about women, or as a measure in-
tentionally and reasonably aimed at remedying past discrimi-
nation. The distinctions between gender classifications which 
33. 417 U.S. 484, 492-93 (1974). 
34. [d. at 493. 
35. [d. at 495 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970». 
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are remedial and permissible, and those which are paternalistic 
and discriminatory are uncertain. Thus, in Weinberger v. 
Weisen/ield,36 the Court rejected a Social Security provision 
awarding survivor's benefits only to widows, while Kahn v. 
Shevin37 upheld a $500 property tax rebate for widows but not 
for widowers. Chief Justice Burger's comment in his concurrence 
in Califano v. Webster,38 a case which upheld a shorter baseline 
period for women in determining Social Security benefits, 
reveals the Court's uncertainty. in this area. While "happy to 
concur in the Court's judgment," the Chief Justice questioned 
"whether certainty in the law is promoted by hinging the valid-
ity of important statutory schemes on whether five Justices view 
them to be more akin to the 'offensive' provisions rejected in 
Weisenfeld and Frontiero, or more like the 'benign' provisions 
upheld in Ballard and Kahn."39 
As with the redistribution and discrimination perspectives 
on pregnancy, uncertainty and disagreement exists over how 
best to frame the issues, and how best to compensate women for 
disadvantages and inequalities which stem from past discrimina-
tion. Inconsistency in decisions and weak reasoning suggest that 
the Court finds a choice between "romantic paternalism" and 
"remedial affirmative action" even more difficult than a choice 
between the discrimination and distribution paradigms of the 
pregnancy benefit cases. Just as one might frame the pregnancy 
benefits controversy as a redistributive question or a sex dis-
crimination question, depending on competing values among 
disability and health insurance and seniority, a choice evolves 
between analyzing benign sex discrimination issues in terms of 
paternalism or remedial action. The choice depends on such 
variables as legislative intent, substantive content, and the im-
portance to the individual of the rights involved. 
A. REMEDIAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION VERSUS ROMANTIC 
PATERNALISM 
The most common reason articulated classifying benign dis-
crimination cases as either paternalism or remedial affirmative 
36. 420 U.s. 636 (1975). 
37. 416 u.s. 351 (1974). 
38. 430 u.s. 313 (1977). 
39. ld. at 321. 
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action is whether the statute at issue was based on or likely to 
perpetuate traditional sex roles or stereotypes, or whether the 
statute was intentionally and reasonably aimed at remedying 
women's historically disadvantaged position in society. The "re-
medial" cases40 reveal this distinction to be quite untenable. In 
Kahn,41 the first of the recent cases in which the Court approved 
benign sex discrimination, Justice Douglas upheld a Florida law 
which granted widows (but not widowers) a $500 annual prop-
erty tax exemption on the grounds that widows would face 
greater difficulties than widowers finding jobs and supporting 
themselves after the death of a spouse. Because women tend to 
become segregated into the lowest paying jobs and earn far less 
than men, and because widows are likely to be older women with 
less experience and fewer skills to offer, the Court considered 
the Florida statute to be reasonably designed to meet a legiti-
mate policy end by reducing the disparity in economic capabili-
ties of men and women.42 
But if, as Justice Brennan stated in dissent in Kahn, there 
is a need for remedial measures to correct economic imbalances 
resulting from "this country's history of pervasive sex discrimi-
nation against women,"48 there is also a danger in redressing 
these imbalances through the use of gender classifications. 
Surely not all widows are unskilled or disfavored when it comes 
to finding jobs; many women work their entire lives, some may 
have even supported their husbands. The tcategory of "all wid-
ows" will undoubtedly include some women who do not need 
help, whil~ omitting many wOplen and men who do. 
The overinclusiveness of the gender classification at issue in 
Kahn is troublesome for two reasons. Initially, it suggests that 
we can safely assume women are dependent on their husbands 
and poorly prepared to support themselves. Even if the intent of 
the statute is to ease the transition from traditionally disfavored 
status and dependent roles, a tax break may perpetuate pre-
cisely those patterns. The legislative provision may reinforce 
financial dependency. Additionally, special benefits may be used 
40. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 
(1975); and Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). 
41. 416 U.S. 351. 
42. [d. at 353-55. 
43. [d. at 359. 
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to rationalize continued discrimination against women. Sec-
ondly, the statute at issue in Kahn was enacted in 1885," which 
suggests as a policy motivation romantic paternalism rather than 
a conscious response to such paternalism. 
Whether Kahn is part of the solution or part of the problem 
is unclear because of an uncritical reliance on stereotypical gen-
eralizations about women. The Court's remedial-permissible 
analysis often incorporates some very traditional and paternalis-
tic policy assumptions and consequences. In Schlesinger v. Bal-
lard/6 the Court upheld the Navy policy of allowing female of-
ficers a more favorable thirteen years in which to be promoted 
before mandatory dismissal, as opposed to only nine years for 
male officers. Justice Stewart explained that "the different treat-
ment of men and women naval officers . . . reflects, not archaic 
and overbroad generalizations, but, instead, the demonstrable 
fact that male and female line officers in the Navy are not simi-
larly situated with respect to opportunities for professional 
service. "46 
Interestingly enough, the Court never examined why women 
"are not similarly situated" in the Navy. Although the Court de-
cided that the policy of differential promotion times was a rea-
sonable way to compensate women for the fact that they have 
fewer opportunities for advancement than men, the Court did 
not examine the underlying policy of assigning women only to 
troop transports and hospital ships. The underlying rationale-
presumably, that women are weaker and less suited for combat 
than men-was not addressed. 
The last in the trio of benign sex discrimination cases, Web-
ster,47 legitimately deserves the "remedial affirmative action" 
description it receives. The Court began with the usual 
disclaimers: 
The more favorable treatment of the female wage 
earner enacted here was not a result of 'archaic 
and overbroad generalizations' about women, or 
44. 416 U.S. at 352. 
45. 419 U.S. 498 (1975). 
46. [d. at 508. 
47. 430 U.S. 313 (1977). 
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of 'the role-typing society has long imposed' upon 
women such as casual assumptions that women 
are 'weaker sex' or are more likely to be child-
rearers or dependants."8 
995 
The "only discernible purpose" of the Social Security policy of 
allowing women a more advantageous baseline for calculating 
old age benefits than men is "the permissible one of redressing 
our society's longstanding disparate treatment of women. "49 
Webster presents a modest remedial measure which neither falls 
short of addressing the practices which have traditionally disfa-
vored women in the job market, like Ballard,GO nor uses overin-
clusive sexual classifications to remedy economic disparities, as 
does Kahn. Gl Whereas the Kahn statute would give all widows, 
regardless of need, a $500 property tax exemption, the statute at 
issue in Webster merely provides that women workers can base 
their pensions on their seventeen most productive earning years, 
while men must base their's on the twenty highest income years. 
Only women who have worked and actually experienced "inhos-
pitality" of the job market are eligible for the higher benefit 
baseline. Moreover, also in contrast to Kahn, the legislative his-
tory of this enactment makes "clear that the differing treatment 
of men and women . . . was not 'the accidental byproduct of a 
traditional way of thinking about females,' . . . but was rather 
deliberately enacted to compensate for particular economic disa-
bilities suffered by women."G2 
In the pregnancy benefits cases, the conclusions differ ac-
cording to whether one views the issues through the prism of 
distributive justice or through that of sex discrimination. Simi-
larly, in the benign discrimination context a measure can be 
viewed as reasonably aimed at remedying past discrimination, or 
as a vestige of paternalistic thinking about the "weaker sex." 
Whereas the choice between competing analyses in the preg-
nancy benefit cases might shift one's attention from the discrim-
inatory impact to competing economic considerations, choosing 
between the "remedial" and "paternalistic" paradigms in the be-
nign discrimination cases presents a more subtle linguistic and 
48. ld. at 317. 
49. ld. 
50. For a discussion of Ballard, see notes 45-56 supra. 
51. For a discussion of Kahn, see notes 41-44 supra. 
52. 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977). 
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perceptual shift. While "paternalistic" and "remedial" may sim-
ply flag Court rejection or approval, they may also represent 
evaluations of statutory intent. 
The "paternalistic" and "remedial" paradigms also re-
present ways of viewing the same facts and perceiving something 
differently, as in a description of a half glass of water as half 
full, or half empty. A statute could aim at remedying the disad-
vantaged position of women, yet make paternalistic assumptions 
about women's earning capabilities, dependency, and institu-
tional arrangements. Whether one labels a statute remedial or 
paternalistic may depend on a conception of its impact on sexual 
equality. In any case, the recognition that certain forms of favor-
itism will do nothing in the long run to assist the status of wo-
men may be the most useful achievement to be gained from con-
sidering the analytical choices in benign discrimination cases. 
The Court's record so far, especially in Kahn and Ballard, sug-
gests that casting issues in facile "remedial" terms may deter 
exploration of other instances which ostensibly favor women but 
perpetuate traditional, stereotypical notions about sex roles. 
B. OTHER FACTORS IN THE CHOICE OF PARADIGM 
While the Court has not been overly careful in distinguish-
ing "remedial" and "paternalistic" uses of benign discrimina-
tion, consideration of the occasions most likely to prompt use of 
the slippery doctrinal tool of "remedial affirmative action," and 
the subsequent approval of policies favoring women, may be in-
structive. The discussion of Satty 58 suggested that the analytic 
framework of discrimination might give way to that of distribu-
tive justice when policies concerned the allocation of public ben-
efits or taxation. Similarly, the Court may be more likely to per-
mit benign gender discrimination when the policies at stake are 
in areas in which the Court traditionally defers to legislative 
prerogative. 
Thus, in upholding Florida's $500 tax exemption for wid.:: 
ows, Justice Douglas wrote in Kahn, "[w]e have long held that 
'where taxation is concerned and no specific federal right, apart 
from equal protection, is imperiled, the States have large leeway 
53. For a discussion of Sa tty, see notes 25-32 supra. 
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in making classifications and drawing lines which in their judg-
ment produce reasonable systems of taxation.'''54 Similarly, 
courts have tended to be particularly deferential to legislative 
prerogative in military affairs, which supports the results in Bal-
lard/SIS Even the willingness to support a favorable baseline de-
termination for female Social Security beneficiaries in Webste,rss 
might be explained in terms of judicial deference to legislative 
plans for administering public benefits. As Justice Rehnquist 
stated in dissent in Califano v. Goldfarb, a case factually similar 
to Webster but decided differently, "[c]ases requiring height-
ened levels of scrutiny for particular classifications under the 
Equal Protection Clause, which have originated in areas of the 
law outside the field of social insurance legislation, should not be 
uncritically carried over into that field."1S7 
It is hardly surprising that courts would be more willing to 
relax sex discrimination standards by choosing paradigms like 
distributive justice or remedial affirmative action in areas where 
budgetary constraints or military expertise compel deference to 
legislative or other judgment. But the consequences of framing 
issues one way rather than another is a choice too important to 
leave to a mere recitation that the area is one of traditional def-
erence. The circumstances which invoke a given paradigm need 
to be more critically studied. 
Instead of deciding whether sex discrimination is permissi-
ble solely according to the degree of traditional discretion ac-
corded the state in particular spheres, an additional guide to 
framing gender discrimination issues might encompass the 
fundamentaIity of the individual rights at stake. Thus, a case 
like Weinberger,ISS which involved the right of a single parent to 
raise his or her child, is distinguishable from a case like Craig v. 
Boren,1S9 which involved the right of eighteen-year-old boys to 
buy beer. The cases concern rights of entirely different magni-
tude. Treating men differently than women seems a far more se-
54. 416 u.s. at 355 (quoting Lenhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 
359 (1973». 
55. For a discussion of Ballard, see notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text. 
56. For a discussion of Webster, see notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text. 
57. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 225 (1977). 
58. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
59. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
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rious matter in the first case. 
The results of choosing an analytical framework on the basis 
of the importance of the rights affected may not lead to obvious 
conclusions, but sensitivity to the demands of the competing is-
s,ues will at least insure a narrowly drawn, carefully crafted ap-
proach to remedying the effects of sex discrimination, as in 
Webster.so 
Looking at the fundamentality of the rights implicated in a 
particular case in order to determine whether it is more impor-
tant to be sensitive to sexual equality, legislative intent, budget-
ary concerns, or bargaining arrangements, is one alternative to 
the current practice of relaxing sex discrimination analysis in ar-
eas of traditional deferral to legislative judgment. Other grounds 
for weighing the persuasiveness of competing paradigms wait to 
be explored and proposed. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Probably the mose recurrent theme in this essay has been 
that the choice of analytical framework for understanding what 
is at stake in a given controversy can dictate its resolution. Be-
cause such choices entail dichotomous, incommensurable appre-
ciation of what considerations are pertinent to an issue, and be-
cause they strongly influence results and are integrally related to 
a sense of justice, more conscious and critical thought is needed 
about what they are and how to choose between them when no 
analysis is overwhelmingly persuasive. 
The difference between "distributive justice" and "sex dis-
crimination" in the pregnancy benefit cases was especially ap-
parent. Adopting the former made it easy to appreciate the im-
portance of competing health care needs, of keeping the cost of 
insurance plans low, and of respecting privately bargained agree-
ments. Conversely, the impact of not including pregnancies in 
disability programs became easy to overlook. The difference be-
tween the "remedial affirmative action" and "romantic paternal-
ism" perspectives on benign discrimination cases, however, was 
not so sharp. Two of the cases in which the Court upheld benign 
60. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra. 
Women's Law Forum 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol11/iss3/8
1981] PREGNANCY AND SEX DISCRIMINATION 999 
discrimination-Kahn and Ballard-make clear that further 
thought about the paternalistic assumptions implicit in many re-
medial schemes is needed. 
A pattern of deference to legislative judgment and increased 
willingness to tolerate sex discrimination in areas of traditional 
legislative discretion emerges from consideration of the preg-
nancy benefit and benign discrimination cases. By focusing on 
the crucial importance of analytical choices and the danger of 
facile comparison, more conscious thought and less reflexive ac-
tion is encouraged. The issues presented in pregnancy benefit 
and benign sex discrimination cases are difficult to resolve. Part . 
of the difficulty stems from genuine uncertainty about what is at 
stake in such cases and about the proper role of judicial inter-
vention in attempts to redress sex discrimination with remedial 
laws or costly disability insurance programs. Particularly in un-
settled areas of law where courts have difficulty choosing be-
tween analytical frameworks and convincingly explaining their 
choices, reflection about what makes one analysis more persua-
sive than another is needed if courts are to evaluate contested 
issues fully and fairly. 
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